I would like to explore two scientific theories that are often said to support radical constructivism. The first is the Schroedinger's cat theory. I don't know the details of this theory, but it argues that at any given moment, two contradictory realities may exist at the same time, such that the same cat may be at once dead and alive. I believe that the argument usually used to link this theory to RC is that objective reality is indeterminate, so that experience is supposed to take priority. This argument does not work, however, because, according to Schroedinger's theory, the cat is objectively both dead and alive, independent of anyone's experience. His theory therefore depends on some form of realism.

The second theory is the one that human expectations affect the metaphysical world, as evidenced by certain experiments with subatomic molecules. This theory also fails to support RC, for the very same reason. The theory once again assumes the existence of an objective world, this time in order that humans may affect it.

Is the principle of scientific fallibility consistent with the RC notion of viability?

Response to Ben Hollows

Supposing we do consider RC only in terms of epistemology and pedagogy, since it claims not to deal with ontology, it still needs to be analyzed in order to determine if its epistemology and pedagogy are worth applying. We might consider it, for example, in comparison with realist epistemology and pedagogy, which do involve ontology and ontological claims. Even though RC does not consider ontology, therefore, it might still be said that this refusal to consider it still constitutes an approach to it, an approach, moreover, that differs significantly from other approaches, and this approach to ontology, among many other things, needs to be considered when analyzing RC for its epistemological and pedagogical value. To put it more shortly, RC epistemology and pedagogy do involve an approach to ontology, even if they do not involve ontology itself.

What are the pedagogical implications of RC?

I have to wonder how seriously radical constructivists take their concept of viability.If science, which uses objectivity to make sense of reality, proves viable, then it seems to make sense to really believe in objectivity. Many radical constructivists, however, will only admit that objectivity seems viable. Does this epistemological move from semblance to actuality constitute a leap of faith?

In Barry's last post, he mentions the postmodern idea of different paradigms and a set of perspectives that constitute knowledge. Similarly, postmodern thinkers often speak about multiple truths. Very early in the semester, we talked in class about truth as function of the relationship between truth claims and something that they refer to, which seems to consist of objective reality. I think that it seems sensible to entertain the notion of multiple valid interpretations of a similar reality. This leads me also to consider the unity or multiplicity of objective reality itself. Is objective reality necessarily one unitary referent, or is it a multiplicity of references? Do both options constitute valid interpretations?

In Bridges to the World, I found very interesting Russel's distinction between fallibility and extreme skepticism. While the former questions the truth of individual claims or beliefs, the latter questions the truth of all claims or beliefs all at once. This extreme form of skepticism self-destructs, because it eliminates any measure of truth by which to determine its own veracity. Also very importantly, this situation makes clear that fallibility requires some measure of truth in order to determine falsehood. It is therefore very important, when operating with fallibility, to keep in mind that there does exist some truth to be recognized.
Is it possible to imagine a world that involves neither truth nor falsity?

I have often come across the theory that concepts that seem new at first are really just combinations of other more basic concepts. However, I'm considering right now the idea that concepts may behave in a way similar to physical reality in giving emergence to things that are substantially different from their component parts. Human consciousness, for example, is very different from the physical components from which it emerges. This leads me to ask if concepts can also interact in such a way as to give emergence to other concepts that are genuinely new. Furthermore, if new concepts are actually possible, then is it also possible to discover things in nature that suggest concepts that are vastly different from concepts that one is already familiar with?

In class, we discussed Ernst von Glasersfeld's agnostic position in regard to metaphysics. However, there are a number of instances in his Introduction to Radical Constructivism at which he seems to acknowledge an external reality, or his argument implies the existence of an external reality. First, he seems to refer favorably to Piaget's theory of evolutionary epistemology, which involves an external reality that eliminates ideas that do not "fit." Given this acknowledgment alone, von Glasersfeld's epistemology does involve an ontological affirmation of external reality. His argument might still assert substantial limits on one's access to such a reality. However, his inability to identify the extent of reality that one cannot know complicates this assertion.

Later, von Glasersfeld discusses the way in which a magician can trick an audience into constructing a particular idea of reality that is not true. This ability to recognize the falsehood of a construction indicates both that human experience does provide access to a certain degree of objectivity, and that objectivity operates to a certain degree in the realm of experience. Knowledge of such objectivity seems to me to undermine radical constructivism.

In regard to von Glasersfeld's alleged separation of epistemology and metaphysics, I cannot conceive of a metaphysical statement that does not invoke epistemology, but is it possible to make an epistemological claim without invoking metaphysics? Epistemology obviously involves an ontology in regard to what can be known, but must it claim anything about the existence of what cannot be known?